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MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AS CATEGORIES
FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT: THE EXEMPTION STRATEGY
KENT GREENAWALT*

INTRODUCTION
My topic differs from the usual inquiries about morality and law,
such as how far law should embody morality, whether legal
interpretation (always or sometimes) includes moral judgment, and
whether an immoral law really counts as law. Concentrating on
exemptions from ordinary legal requirements, I am interested in
instances when the law might make especially relevant the moral
judgments of individual actors. I am particularly interested in
whether the law should ever treat moral judgments based on
religious conviction differently from moral judgments that lack such
a basis.
A striking example for both questions is conscientious objection
to military service. In the history of our country, objectors to
military service have received exemptions from conscription; even
in our present volunteer army, those who develop a conscientious
objection to participation in any war are relieved from military duty
they would otherwise have to perform as a consequence of their
initial commitment to service.' The law as it is now written requires
that an objection be based on "religious training and belief."2 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the law to include all genuine
conscientious objectors. 3
Before we tackle the difficult questions, I need to essay various
distinctions and clarifications. In its broadest sense, morality may
* University Professor, Columbia University, teaching at Columbia Law School.
Much of this Essay will subsequently be published as a chapter in Religion and the
Constitution:Volume 2: Nonestablishment and Fairness.
1. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000).
2. Id.
3. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40, 344 (1970) (plurality opinion).
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include all actions that are obligatory or, on balance, desirable. I
mean to invoke a narrower sense that includes responsibilities to
other people and to nonhuman animals, and responsibilities to
conduct oneself with a kind of dignity. According to this crude
division, morality does not include a sense of obligation to worship
God or to obey dietary laws established by religious texts; it does
include a responsibility to tell the truth, to avoid needless cruelty to
animals, and to avoid self-destructive acts. This division is far from
perfect. One might find responsibilities to others in acts that I am
treating as other than moral. For example, a person's worship of
God might be thought directly to enhance the welfare of her
community or to help make her a more moral individual. And
treating a failure to observe dietary laws (which I place outside the
realm of morality) differently from extreme substance abuse may
seem arbitrary. If one takes the dietary laws seriously, one might
think God will somehow punish infractions, so violations could harm
oneself as much as does serious drug abuse. A scholar might
undertake a careful study of actual usage and then attempt to shape
the term "morality" in a way that would be more coherent philosophically. I am settling for something much less ambitious that
nevertheless allows us to recognize the following points.
First, as in the conscientious objector illustration, people may
develop otherwise similar moral convictions with or without relying
on religious sources, as those are ordinarily conceived. One pacifist
may rely on a biblical passage about turning the other cheek,4
another may develop his view based on a historical conclusion about
the inevitable loss of innocent life in war. The connection between
a person's religious affiliation or belief and his conviction about
what he should be may be direct or somehow attenuated.
Second, whether a person's sense that he should (or may) do
something is or is not based on religion, he may have a wide range
of different attitudes about the matter-he may think he is
obligated to do it, that doing it would be morally preferable but not
obligatory, that doing it is morally permitted, and so on.5

4. Matthew 5:39.
5. See John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 779, 785 (1986).
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Third, because not all perceived religious obligations fit within
the category of perceived moral obligations, some demands or
requests for privileging religious behavior will not involve claims of
moral obligation and will not have any parallel in nonreligious
moral convictions. A recent potential illustration has emerged in
New York City. According to the practice of some ultra-Orthodox
Jewish groups, a mohel sucks the blood from the cut of a circumcised infant.6 On a few occasions, this practice has-infected infants
with herpes, and one infant died as a consequence.7 Thus far, the
health commissioner has issued an open letter indicating the danger
of the procedures.' Some individuals want the practice to be
forbidden.9 The religious claim not to have the practice forbidden
does not involve morality in my narrower sense. And, while we could
fantasize about someone who believed on nonreligious health
grounds that such a procedure would be morally desirable, in reality
no such claim is conceivable. For cases such as this, there is no
nonreligious moral parallel to the religious claim.
How do personal preferences fit my categorization of morality? If
we take preferences broadly to include all the things a person
prefers, that would include preferences for the welfare of others that
might encompass moral duties. I prefer to be allowed to assist my
children; I believe I have a moral duty to assist them. While I talk
about personal preferences in this Essay, I am excluding preferences
that involve moral duty in this way. Preferences can be relevant
to moral evaluation, nevertheless, in at least two ways. If I have
an extremely strong self-interested reason to do something, I may
believe others have a moral responsibility to let me do it. I may
think, that is, that I have a moral right to do it. Further, I may
think that what would otherwise be a moral duty on my part can be
overridden by some very powerful matter of self-interest; I may
break a promise to meet a friend for lunch if the opportunity to win
$100,000 presents itself. One of the questions that will engage us is
whether strong preferences should sometimes be included with
6. Jeffirey Rosen, Is Ritual CircumcisionReligious Expression?,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 28; Jim Rutenberg & Andy Newman, Mayor Balances Hasidic Ritual
Against Fearsfor Babies' Health, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at Al.
7. See Rutenberg & Newman, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. See Rosen, supra note 6.
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moral reasons as a basis for special treatment. I shall focus on one
way in which moral judgments, or religious affiliations or convictions, may be afforded a special status under the law: exemptions
from requirements that apply to other citizens.

I. THE EXEMPTION STRATEGY: A MATTER OF JUSTICE?
Let us suppose that the government has some good reason to
compel or forbid behavior, such as requiring people to serve on
juries. Some citizens believe that participating in this way involves
immoral cooperation with the coercive apparatus of legal enforcement. What should the legislature do?
It has three options. One is to adopt the regulation without any
exceptions. Another is to decide against requiring anyone to serve
on juries. The third option is the exemption strategy. People, in
general, are required to serve, but an exception is made for a limited
class of persons. If the legislature pursues the exemption strategy,
it must define the category of those who will receive the exemption.
An exemption might be cast in terms of an activity, a belief, a
status, or some combination of these. Thus, an exemption from
combatant military service granted to all those who are conscientiously opposed to such service is phrased in terms of belief."0 An
exemption from a prohibition on the use of peyote given to members
of religious congregations who standardly use peyote in worship
services, is formulated in terms of activity (use in services) and
status (membership in a group of this kind)."
Any intuition we may have that the state should sometimes make
concessions to strong moral and religious claims needs to be tested
against arguments that exemptions are misguided, or at most are
a subject of legislative grace. This exercise can help us to identify
appropriate grounds for exemptions.
It helps initially to draw two distinctions. The first is emphasized
by Jeremy Waldron. 2 The instances for which an exemption is
sought may or may not present the danger that underlies the
10. See Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000).
11. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2006).
12. See Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All? The Logic of Cultural Accommodation, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3 (2002).
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regulation.13 The extremely small amount of wine consumed during
communion presents no danger of intoxication, the reason for
forbidding consumption of alcohol.14 By contrast, if the reason to
prohibit peyote is to prevent hallucinatory effects, that reason does
cover religious ceremonies during which these effects are understood to have deep religious significance. A claim for an exemption
is strengthened if the instances to be exempted do not involve the
harm that underlies a regulation.
Drawing from a different dichotomy proposed by Christopher
Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, we can distinguish between claims
that a belief or activity should be specially privileged and claims
that a belief or activity should be protected against unfair treatment." The idea underlying privilege is that religion or conscience
deserves special consideration, because it is particularly valuable or
important, or because many people care intensely about it.
One argument based on privilege is that the state should aim to
preserve a way of life that is intimately connected to the practice for
which an exemption is sought. Reserving other claims of privilege
for later consideration, we may dispose of the preservation argument, as far as religion is concerned. A liberal state cannot have the
aim to preserve a religion, in the sense that some multiculturalists
believe the state should try to preserve minority cultures. 6

13. See id. at 5-9.
14. See id. at 5. However, a small sip might lead a congregant to want more to drink, and
a priest who consumes consecrated wine remaining after the ceremony might possibly drink
enough to become intoxicated.
15. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994).
16. DAviD MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 120 (1995). There is a complexity here that I will
remark on but not try to resolve. If the government legitimately tries to maintain a minority
culture, such as that of the Inuit, that culture will include religious elements, and these are
not likely to be sharply distinguished from other aspects of culture. A policy to maintain the
culture cannot easily aim to maintain the culture minus those religious elements. What is the
government then to do? One might say it can include religious elements with all others,
attempting to preserve them as aspects of culture, not because they are religious. But
probably the government should concentrate on nonreligious elements, insofar as possible,
allowing the religious elements to be preserved only because they are connected to other
elements that are supported. In any event, this problem would not affect the legitimacy of a
policy to preserve Christian Science or Mormonism, religions not connected to any minority
culture.
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A liberal state should be neutral among religious perspectives,
not aiming to get citizens to adopt one particular religion or another.
Barring past or present oppression by the government or other
members of a society, the government should not try to preserve a
religion that might otherwise disappear; doing so would be aiming
to get some citizens to continue to adhere to that religion. It is
true that in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court was apparently
influenced by expert testimony that, were Amish children required
to attend school until they were sixteen, this could threaten the
existence of the Amish community. 7 But, insofar as a group's
survival is relevant, it matters because it shows the group's intense
concern about the practice it wants to maintain, and bears on the
harshness of the government's forbidding that practice, not because
the state should have an objective to keep religions alive.
We can see the idea of protection as the safeguarding of those who
seek an exemption to avoid treatment that is unfair in relation to
how others are treated. Most straightforwardly, the claim may be
that treatment is really unequal, despite formal or surface equality.
When claims for exemptions are viewed in this way, proponents and
opponents may dispute what kind of treatment is "really" equal, or,
more precisely, which kind of equality is normatively most important.
Unfair treatment can take the form of self-conscious discrimination, but it can also be more subtle, involving only conscious
indifference-regulators are not aiming to harm a group but they
are aware the group Will suffer badly and do not care-or inadvertent neglect-regulators are not aware of how a group will suffer.
Two of the critical issues about protection of individuals against
discrimination are whether the intentions and awareness of
legislators matter and whether judges can reasonably decide why
legislators have failed to grant exemptions. 8
We turn now to what we may call exemption-skepticism. The
most important arguments against a use of the exemption strategy
are based on rule of law, equality, and administrability. As Waldron
17. 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
18. One possible approach would be to "objectify" the inquiry, asking what a person who
has voted as the legislators have voted, would probably think, rather than asking what the
actual legislators probably thought.
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has noted, one aspect of Dicey's concept of the rule of law is that
laws apply to all persons, not providing one rule for officials,
19
another for citizens, one rule for nobility, another for commoners.
Dicey's main target was those in power privileging themselves, 20 but
we can extend the rule of law concern to other special exceptions to
ordinary standards of behavior. An exception granted exclusively
on the basis of activity is not in tension with the rule of law, so
long as any person may participate in the activity that enjoys the
exception. 2 ' But exceptions granted on the basis of belief or status
do threaten the realization of this ideal.
The concern about equality relates closely to that about rule of
law. An exemption treats some people differently from others; it
allows some to do what others may not do. This difference in treatment requires justification.2 2
The worry about administrability applies to beliefs and, less
strongly, to status. Any exemption requires enforcement officials
to identify who qualifies. That will be simple if the exemption
extends to all those engaging in an easily observable activity, such
as wearing a turban. Identification is more complicated if officials
must ascertain membership or another kind of status, but usually
determining whether someone belongs to a particular group or
occupies a particular position will not be too hard. Ascertaining
beliefs is much more troublesome. It may take a substantial
administrative apparatus to determine if someone is a conscientious
objector, and determinations may often be erroneous. Much the
same is true if an exemption turns on how important a belief or
practice is within an individual's or group's overall set of beliefs.
19. Waldron, supra note 12, at 3.
20. A.N. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 185

(photo. reprint 2004) (5th ed. 1897) ("We mean ... when we speak of the 'rule of law' ... not only
that with us no man is above the law, but ... that here every man, whatever be his rank or
condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm ..... ).
21. If the activity is one that only some people can comfortably undertake, such as the
practice that once existed of allowing men who paid a high fee to be excused from compulsory
military service, an exemption cast in terms of an action may be regarded as unfairly
depending on a kind of status. For any exemption based on action, one can ask if it connects
unfairly to status or belief. With respect to some activities, such as wearing turbans, that only
a specific group of people wish to engage in, an exemption based on an activity may in reality
be limited to people with a particular membership or status.
22. Again, this problem does not arise if the exemption is cast in terms of an activity that
does not connect significantly to membership or status.
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The force of these various concerns may lead us to wonder if an
exemption strategy is ever justified. If some people have a very
strong reason not to be subjected to a regulation, that is a good
reason not to impose the regulation on anyone; if the government
has a powerful reason to regulate, perhaps it should make no
exceptions. Withdrawing exemptions already granted would be
impolitic, but, in principle, the government should be very hesitant
to grant them. This view is powerfully defended by Brian Barry,
who employs a pincers approach: "Usually,... either the case for the
law (or some version of it) is strong enough to rule out exemptions,
or the case that can be made for exemptions is strong enough to
suggest that there should be no law anyway. 2 3
Among the subjects Barry discusses are requirements of humane
slaughter, the wearing of motorcycle helmets, the attachment of a
red and orange triangle to the back of slow vehicles, and school
clothing that excludes head scarves.24 His rich discussion of these
examples and others is not easily summarized, but I can provide
enough of their flavor to indicate his overall position.
Humane slaughter laws require that animals be stunned before
they are killed.2" According to Jewish kosher and Muslim halal
standards, slaughter should be by their traditional methods, which
Barry characterizes as "a euphemism for bleeding animals to death
while conscious."26 Barry notes that in some countries that do not
make exceptions, rabbis have accepted the stunning of animals and
that Jews and Muslims unwilling to make this adjustment are free
to become vegetarians.2 7 Barry clearly believes that the interest in
preventing animal suffering is sufficient to sustain an exceptionless
law.
Barry's position about motorcycle helmets is more complex. 28 He
is attracted by the idea that Sikhs, like everyone else, have an
23. BRIAN

BARRY,

CULTURE

AND

EQUALITY:

AN

EGALITARIAN

CRITIQUE

OF

MULTICULTURALISM 39 (Harv. Univ. Press 2001).
24. See id. at 40-49, 60-62, 184-87.
25. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (2000).
26. BARRY, supra note 23, at 41.
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id. at 33-34, 49. Barry writes that "it is questionable that the wearing of a turban is
a religious obligation for Sikhs, as against a customary practice among some," id. at 33, but
that doubt is not crucial for his analysis.
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opportunity to ride with a helmet, and that if they do not wish to do
so, they can forego riding motorcycles." He also recognizes that
there may be strong reasons of religion and custom, and of preference, to ride without helmets.3 ° Given these reasons, it is arguable
whether the helmet requirement should be imposed on anyone,
despite the safety considerations, mainly paternalistic ones, in favor
of the requirement.
These examples give us a sense of Barry's pincers. He acknowledges that once exemptions have been granted, eliminating them
may create practical problems. But if we ask whether exemptions
should be granted in the first place, Barry responds that, "[ojnce we
accept ...that the case for exemptions must be based on the
alleviation of hardship rather than the demands of justice, it seems
to me much more problematic to make it out than is widely assumed."' '"To make sense," the exemption approach "requires a
combination of very precise conditions that are rarely satisfied all
together. It must be important to have a rule generally prohibiting
conduct of a certain kind ....
[But] having a rule must not be so
important as to preclude allowing exceptions to it."32 Not "too many"
cases fit these conditions. 3
Evaluating the strength of the argument against exemptions
depends on assessing equality and rule of law concerns, and on
deciding whether the reasons to exempt some persons can be fairly
distinguished from reasons that those who do not benefit from an
exemption may have not to comply. In one simple form, the antiexemption claim is that people with strong preferences to commit
otherwise illegal acts do not receive exemptions and that reasons
of conscience, and religion, are not relevantly distinguishable from
strong preferences. Therefore, the exemption strategy is misguided.
29. Id. at 45.
30. See id. at 47.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Id. at 62.
33. Id. Barry does present a formulation that sounds somewhat more receptive to religious
exemptions, but he repeats his observation that exemptions are not required by justice. Id.
at 175. In discussing my draft at a Columbia seminar in the autumn of 2005, Akeel Bilgrami
suggested that the typical circumstance in which an exemption is warranted may be when the
wisdom of a restriction is itself doubtful. Perhaps many justified exemptions may be so
explained, but not all. For example, compulsory military service was undoubtedly warranted
for World War II, but so was an exemption for conscientious objectors.
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The argument, at least in this simple form, is misconceived not only
in its equation of conscience and religious observance with strong
preferences-the typical objection-but also in its assumption about
the status of strong preferences.
Let me take the second point first. Prohibitive laws do not exempt
those with strong desires to engage in the forbidden behavior.
Indeed, many serious criminal laws are aimed primarily at just
those who have such desires, as most people are effectively constrained by their moral sense from committing murder and rape.
But when we come to regulations involving motorcycle helmets,
regulations mainly designed to protect the very people whose
actions are restrained, is it so obvious that no exception should be
made for those with intense preferences not to wear helmets?
To pose this question in principle, we need first to put aside
problems of administrability. Measuring intensity of preference is
well nigh impossible;3 4 and people with some desire to engage in a
prohibited activity have an incentive to overstate that desire if those
with strong preferences are to be excused. The only way in which a
strong preference exception could be administered would be by
having people purchase a license to ride without a helmet or make
some other sacrifice that most people would not be willing to make.
Short of such a scheme, a prohibition cannot, practically, make
exceptions for those with strong preferences. But that does not tell
us whether such exceptions would be otherwise desirable; and that
alone is not a powerful reason to deny more limited exemptions that
are administrable. 5
We need first to assume that the strong preferences in question
are not immoral, self-destructive, or developed in a manner that
perpetuates social inequality. A strong preference would be immoral
if it is unduly neglectful of the interests of others. A preference
would be self-destructive (and perhaps immoral) if its indulgence
would harm its holder. Preferences of alcoholics to drink and of
addicts to use hard drugs are self-destructive in this way, and a
34. More precisely, it is virtually impossible to measure the intensity of A's desire to do
X against Bs desire to do X. Determining whether A's desire to do X is greater than A's desire
to do Y or Z is not so hard.
35. However, if strong preferences should be exempted, but for problems of
administration, there could be some concern about whether those with such preferences are
fairly treated if others are exempted.
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legislature might well decide not to yield to preferences whose
fulfillment is damaging. The idea about preferences that perpetuate
inequalities is harder to pin down, but seems partly to underlie
assumptions that those with expensive tastes should not be
rewarded by getting a greater share of goods.
We should not leap from a conclusion about expensive tastes and
the distribution of limited resources to a conclusion about all strong
preferences and all prohibitions. Most people have intensely positive
feelings about some activities in which they engage. The activity
that most commonly creates intense physical pleasure and satisfaction is sexual relations. Let us imagine that for some few individuals-ecstatic riders-riding a motorcycle without a helmet is like a
sexual experience, and riding with a helmet is terribly unsatisfying.
Riding without a helmet definitely increases physical risk, but is
the increase in safety supplied by such a restriction worth the cost?
If we focused only on the pleasure of sexual relations, putting
aside its connections to love, companionship, and procreation,3 6 and
we supposed that sexual relations carried risks comparable to
those of riding without helmets,3" we would still be very surprised
if a legislature would forbid all sexual acts. Legislators would not
deem the reduction in physical risk to be worth the cost to the
quality of life. It follows that in regard to the ecstatic riders, viewed
as a separate class, the balance of benefit and harm of regulation is
unfavorable. Would it not make sense to exempt them if they could
be easily identified?" Note that excusing the ecstatic riders would
not impose on other riders who are required to wear helmets, in the
manner that a shift of tangible resources does.3" This hypothetical
raises some serious questions about a premise that, in principle,
those with strong preferences do not warrant exemptions; but I shall
not pursue these further.

36. In the not too distant future, artificial means may suffice for procreation.
37. Of course, some sexual relations do carry grave risks.
38. If one reason to require helmets is to reduce medical expenses for society, we might
require the riders to pay a special fee or carry insurance.
39. Those with weak preferences are denied a privilege afforded the ecstatic riders, but
they are in the same boat, whether or not an exemption is given. I put aside here the reality
that when accidents kill riders or render them unconscious, the roads are more dangerous for
others.
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Assuming that strong preferences do not warrant exemptions,
how should we compare strong preferences with conscientious
opposition? Here Barry's stance resists distinctions and comparisons
that are often made. His basic position is that people have an
opportunity to do things, whether or not their disinclination to do
them is based on strong preference or conviction.4 ° Remember that
in discussing humane slaughter and motorcycle helmets, Barry
points out that people with religious objections need not eat meat or
ride motorcycles.41 The state does not demand that they violate their
religious sentiments; their problem arises only because they have a
powerful wish to eat meat or to ride a motorcycle.42
Even when the government creates a direct conflict by forbidding
an act a person thinks is required by conscience or religious practice, or by requiring an act the person thinks is forbidden, Barry
does not see much of a distinction between these conflicts and
conflicts with strong preferences.4 3 If it is said that beliefs cannot
easily be changed, the same can be said about many preferences.44
Responding to the comparison between persons with claims of
conscience and those with physical disabilities, Barry says that "[t]o
suggest that they are similarly situated is in fact offensive to both
parties."4 5 A person with a physical inability to perform an act lacks
an opportunity that is qualitatively different from a conviction
against doing the act; and a person who "freely embraces a religious
belief' does not perceive it "as analogous to the unwelcome burden
of a physical disability. 4 6
In considering the comparison of strong preferences to convictions, and to desires to engage in religious or cultural practices with
deep meaning, I shall start with direct conflicts, and then turn to
restrictions that do not generate direct conflicts.

40. See BARRY, supranote 23, at 32.
41. See id. at 35, 45.
42. About kosher slaughter, Barry writes that "an appeal to religious liberty provides only
spurious support for this and other similar exemptions, because the law does not restrict
religious liberty, only the ability to eat meat." Id. at 44.
43. See id. at 35-36.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 37.
46. Id.
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For direct conflicts, as when the government requires jury service
that an individual resists, the difference between preference and
conscience hits us in the face. If I have a conscientious belief that I
should not perform an act, I believe it would be deeply wrong for
me to do so; I believe I should not do so even if the cost is a very
considerable sacrifice of my own welfare. A person with a conscientious objection to combatant military service believes it would be
better to die than to kill in war.4 7 A genuine objector to jury service
need not believe service would be worse than death but she must
believe she should undergo real hardship rather than serve. The
person who has only a strong preference feels she should forego
satisfying the preference if the advantages are substantial. Moral
conviction is not a barrier. The government should usually not try
to compel people to do what they are opposed in conscience to doing.
A conflict between legal requirement and conscience creates a much
more severe opposition4 8 than a conflict between legal requirement
and strong preference, even a very strong preference. To summarize
this discussion of direct conflicts, we cannot easily move from an
assumption that strong preferences do not deserve exemption to a
conclusion that claims of conscience do not either.
Analysis of situations when the law does not impose direct
conflicts involves an extra element. To take the motorcycle example,
why not say with Barry that all the law forbids is riding a motorcycle without a helmet and that no Sikh believes that as a matter
of culture or religion he must ride a motorcycle? Thus, all that the
law frustrates is a strong preference. The appeal of this argument
depends in part on how essential the activity is to the frustrated
individual. If motorcycles and bicycles were the primary modes of
transportation for poor people, a helmet requirement would severely
circumscribe enjoyment of a wide range of opportunities for poor
Sikhs, even if all their difficulties could be capsulated as involving
preferences rather than convictions or acts with deep meaning. But
even if the frustrations are minor, there is a problem with the law
47. This is not to say the sincere objector necessarily will have the courage to die, but he
believes he should. Some objectors believe they can serve in noncombatant roles, and if their
applications for conscientious objector status are granted, they are assigned to such roles.
48. Either the requirement fails to compel, as with objectors to military service who go to
jail, or the requirement succeeds and the objector feels he has been forced by the state to
violate his deepest moral sense.
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effectively preventing people from enjoying some opportunities,
because they are barred from performing other acts that would
correspond with their consciences or with deep religious practice.
If virtually everyone in the culture has an opportunity to ride a
motorcycle, it seems unfair to deny that chance to someone because
he cannot bring himself to comply with an ordinary condition for
use. A similar conclusion, applies to a doctor or a nurse who feels
she cannot participate in an abortion. It is not enough to say, 'Well,
you don't need to be in this profession if you don't want to perform
the ordinary procedures."
An exemption strategy can make sense, in principle, if either (1)
exemptions might make sense for strong preferences; or (2) claims
of conscience and of religious needs can be relevantly distinguished
from strong preferences. Although because of difficulties of administration, it might conceivably always be a bad idea to grant exemptions, a legislature can make a principled decision to have a general
requirement from which some people are exempt.
Could an exemption be a matter of justice, that is, could those
who want to receive an exemption have a valid claim of justice on
their behalf? Barry writes that the case for group-differentiated
rights is that "departures from equal liberty ...
can be supported
pragmatically"4 9 and that "the case for exemptions must be based on
the alleviation of hardship rather than the demands of justice."5
In addressing the question of whether exemptions may be
required by justice, we need initially to clarify six points. One major
issue about exemptions is whether they should be determined by
legislatures, administrators, or courts. Americans, accustomed to
the notion that an exemption required by constitutional right falls
within the domain of justice, can easily slip into the fallacy that, if
legislatures are the proper bodies to determine exemptions, these
must be subjects of discretion, or grace, or pragmatic judgment.
However, in some countries, no constitutional rights enforceable by
courts exist.5 Even in countries like the United States, with its
49. See BARRY, supra note 23, at 12.
50. Id. at 39; see also id. at 33, 175 (making a less absolute statement).
51. Great Britain has long been the most notable example, but membership in the
European Community now carries obligations not to violate basic rights that are enforceable
by European tribunals. See generally Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
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extensive constitutional rights, many issues of social justice are left
to legislative decision. In the United States, legislatures decide
whether to impose capital punishment for murder,5 2 an issue that
certainly concerns justice. Legislative determinations about tax
rates mix issues of prudence and justice. Scholars who argue for no
or limited judicial review of legislation commonly contend that
legislatures, not courts, should be the final arbiter of disagreements
over what justice requires.5 3 Because a claim that legislatures
should typically decide about exemptions does not resolve whether
they may be required by justice, we should not conflate Barry's
preference for legislative choice with his assertions that exemptions
are matters of (mere) prudence. 4
Second, saying exactly when a claim of hardship becomes more
than a prudential claim and turns into a claim of justice is not
simple. The basic claim about just treatment concerns fairness,
what burdens one can fairly be asked to bear and what benefits one
is entitled to as a member of the political community. Although a
claim of justice can be overcome by competing considerations, the
claim involves something more than an assertion about the balance
of advantages.
Third, the fact that people may reasonably disagree about
whether an exemption should be given does not establish that if one
is given, the reason is a prudent exercise of discretion rather than
a valid claim of justice. A claim of justice may be both debatable
and, on balance, convincing.
Fourth, arguments about exemptions often mingle discussions
about justice and more prudential considerations, especially the
ease or difficulty of administering whatever exemption might be
granted. If the arguments for an exemption that are based on
justice are strong, and the prudential and justice-based arguments
against the exemption are not too powerful, justice might require an
exemption. 5
52. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (plurality opinion).
53. E.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 15 (1999).

54. The two issues are, however, connected in the following way: if Barry is right that
claims for exemption are not based on justice, that is a substantial reason to assign decision
making to legislatures.
55. The phrasing of this statement does concede that strong prudential arguments against
an exemption might lead to a conclusion that justice does not require what justice might
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A fifth clarification is that when we ask about claims ofjustice, we
must be careful what alternative we have in mind. The standard
argument of justice supposes that legislators have adopted, or will
adopt, a regulation, and the question is whether they should grant
an exemption. If one compares an exemption with the option of no
regulation, things will look different. Unless a regulation protects
innocent victims, 6 no one has a complaint of justice if the state
decides not to regulate. Thus, it could be a matter of prudence
whether to have no regulation or regulation with an exemption, a
matter of justice whether to have regulation of all persons or to
create an exemption for some.5 7
Finally, we need to understand that a valid claim of justice could
be based on a sound argument either about privilege or about equal
or fair treatment. Not every claim of justice is based on a comparison of how different people are treated. The conscientious objector
urges that society acts unjustly if it demands that people who object
in conscience to killing, prepare themselves to kill others. Put in
this simple form, the claim is one of justice based on the violation of
an objector's moral right not to be forced to kill. That is a claim of
privilege.
A claim of justice based on protection is perhaps even easier to
identify, but we must work harder to pin it down satisfactorily.
Against the view that he is treated equally with all those who are
subjected to a regulation, the person who claims he should receive
require in the absence of the prudential considerations. I prefer this way of speaking to the
following alternative: "Justice requires an exemption, but it would be imprudent; therefore,
on balance, the government should not grant an exemption required by justice."
56. If a regulation would protect innocent victims, they may have a claim ofjustice to have
it imposed. In that event, for the claim of justice of those who seek an exemption to be sound,
it must be powerful enough to offset or outweigh the claim of justice of victims to have the
regulation apply across the board. Thus, imagine that a draft is to be introduced because a
volunteer army unjustly casts the burden of dying for one's country on the poor. If the mostly
affluent and educated conscientious objectors are to receive an exemption on grounds of
justice, their claim must be strong enough to outweigh the concern that the exemption will
have some tendency to burden the poor. In all cases in which the claim for exemption is to
allow some people (especially parents) to treat others in a manner that would normally be
regarded as unjust, as imposing serious corporal punishment, concern for potential victims
is a central factor.
57. Even if we focused on no regulation or regulation with an exemption, we might think
the arguments for regulation with exemption are mainly prudential ones, and the arguments
against exemption mainly ones of justice.
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an exemption urges that his treatment is unequal (or at least
unfair). He contends that he is not situated similarly to others who
are subject to the regulation. The issue of how strong preferences
compare with claims of conscience now emerges as part of the
question whether exemptions are required by justice.
The member of the Native American Church who wants to use
peyote in his religious ceremonies can offer two useful comparisons.
He first points out that when legislatures have adopted prohibitions
of alcohol use they have made exceptions for the sacramental use of
wine."8 Given that alcohol is at least as damaging to people as is
peyote,"s the church member argues that his treatment is unfair
in comparison with the position of those who use (and have used)
wine in religious ceremonies within jurisdictions that forbid use
of alcohol."0 He asserts with confidence that the government
would not ban all use of peyote were it a common feature of worship
in mainstream churches. He should not be denied an exemption
because he is part of a small, powerless minority.
The church member's second comparison is with those who want
to use (or would use)" peyote for recreational purposes. If he does
not think it is positively mandatory to use peyote in a religious
ceremony, he nevertheless regards it as the central element of his
deepest religious (and cultural) experience. The prohibition operates
on him much more harshly than it does on a recreational user,
even one who believes use of peyote yields profound experiences
and insights. Thus, the church member claims he is not similarly
situated to others who are subject to the law. Though the law
58. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
59. I am putting aside Waldron's point that use of peyote in worship involves some
"harms" against which a regulation is aimed, Waldron, supra note 12, at 8, something not true
about minimal use of alcohol. This point could be developed as part of a counterargument. My
aim here is to exhibit the structure of the claim, not to resolve whether, on balance, it is
convincing.
60. He may, of course, add that a total ban on religious use of peyote reflects a kind of
contempt for Indian religion.
61. It is commonly said that peyote is not a drug of choice, see, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy,
Rethinking Free Exercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne: Chartinga Middle Course, 68
Miss. L.J. 105, 145-46 (1998), a fact which might suggest that if the members of churches that
use peyote have a strong claim, the result should be no regulation, rather than rule and
exemption. Insofar as the "not a drug of choice" conclusion rests on the availability of an
illegal drug, marijuana, it seems to me a dubious starting point for analysis. Probably one has
to ask if people would choose to use peyote if related prohibitions were effective.
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operates with formal equality, it operates unfairly by imposing a
deprivation that a legislature would never impose on a substantial
part of the population.
On examination, the force of this argument cannot depend
exclusively on a particularly intense desire to ingest peyote or on
the fact that there would be no ban if most people badly wanted to
use peyote. Barry points out that all criminal laws operate with
unequal effect.6 2 That some people would like to commit particular
crimes much more than would other people does not make the laws
unequal or unfair in their operation."3 And what any society
regulates depends largely on the values held by most members of
that society. An activity that is forbidden in Society A, say riding a
motorcycle without a helmet, is allowed in Society B, where many
people highly value riding without a helmet. To some extent,
majorities in various societies regulate on the basis of their values,
and the minority with different values must go along. That legislation would be different if most people had the values of the minority
does not necessarily show injustice.
What more is needed to sustain the protection argument for
injustice? Perhaps claimants must show that they are being
disregarded in terms of some form of identification, such as religion
or culture, as to which the majority should not ride roughshod over
a minority; that their ground of action has some claim to being
privileged (this approach combines aspects of privilege and protection); or that what the legislature has done in respect to them
imposes harm so disproportionate to benefit that it amounts to
comparative unfairness.
In any event, the central points I have made so far are that an
exemption may be required by justice even if the decision is rightly
assigned to the legislature, even if the wisdom of an exemption is
arguable, even if considerations of prudence mix with those of
justice, and whether the fundamental reason to exempt is to
privilege certain activities or to assure fair treatment. Once we
grasp these points, we can see that some exemptions are more than
a good idea: they are required by justice.

62. BARRY, supra note 23, at 34.
63. See id.
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This is not to say that every warranted exemption is required by
justice. Sometimes the crucial arguments will be ones of mere
prudence; and often the arguments against an exemption will be
strong enough so that a legislature may properly deny it without
acting unjustly. A reasonable decision to grant the exemption will
then not be required by justice.
It is not my aim here to say just when justice, rather than
utilitarian or prudential considerations, is dominant, or to say just
what exemptions justice may require. It is simply to rebut any
contention that justice never requires exemption,' that whenever
legislatures are considering exemptions, they need focus only upon
prudential considerations.
To show that the exemption strategy is desirable in a considerable
number of circumstances and that exemptions are sometimes
required by justice, one would need to consider a wide range of
possible examples."5 I have tried to do that elsewhere.6
II. RELIGION AND MORALITY AS POSSIBLE BASES FOR EXEMPTIONS
Religious claims indisputably form one possible basis for various
exemptions; claims based on nonreligious convictions and on strong
preferences are others. Any sorting of claims into qualifying and
nonqualifying can be avoided by a system of self-selection. As I have
argued elsewhere about conscientious objection to military service,
a workable system of self-selection is actually preferable to having
officials decide whether someone qualifies for an exemption." Self64. I should say that taking Barry's book as a whole, it is doubtful whether it does
advance such a contention, although some individual sentences support it. See, e.g., BARRY,
supra note 23, at 38 ("I have argued so far that the differential impact of a general law cannot
in itself found a claim that the law is unjust."). At a workshop of the Columbia Center for Law
and Philosophy discussing the book, Barry was clear that some exemptions might be required
by justice.
65. The claim that justice requires an exemption is easiest to make when the activity the
claimants want to protect does not present the dangers that concern the government, but I
am assuming, that justice may require an exemption on some occasions in which the dangers
do arise.
66. See generallyKENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS (2006).
67. Id. at 49-67. Self-selecting might not be fair, if the alternative needs to be so onerous
to exclude others than those with reasons of conscience, that the cost to those with reasons
of conscience is too great. If, for example, it was necessary to conscript ninety-five percent of
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selection is feasible only when those who badly want an exemption
pay for it or make some other sacrifice that most people would not
be willing to make to receive the same privilege.' Thus, to take an
example we have considered, a state might allow motorcycle riders
to go without helmets if they pay $1000 a year for the privilege.
Insofar as such a market approach favors the rich-for a millionaire
who rides for recreation $1000 may be only a minor annoyance, but
for a farm worker who rides to work $1000 may be prohibitively
expensive-a state might make the fee proportional to income or
wealth, or impose nonmonetary service, such as the alternative
service that conscientious objectors have had to perform.6 9
Short of instituting a scheme of self-selection, a state should not
extend an exemption to all those with strong preferences. We may
take strong preferences here as the same kinds of wishes and
desires that many people have, but that greatly exceed their
ordinary strength. As I have explained, the reason why people with
strong preferences should not receive an exemption is not that, in
principle, one could never be warranted.7 ° Rather, such an exemption would generate three related problems connected to its
administration. First, even if claimants are honest and articulate,
and possess morally acceptable preferences developed independent
of the regulation in question, officials (whether law enforcement
officers on the spot or administrators issuing licenses) would find it
difficult to decide when the standards for the exemption had been
satisfied. Second, claimants would have powerful tactical incentives
to overstate their preferences in order to gain a cost-free exemption.
If all that was at issue was someone's strength of preference,
administrators would not easily spot liars. Third, claimants might

the young population for military service and alternative civilian service had to be set at six
years (compared with two years of military service) in order for self-selection to yield adequate
military personnel, that could be unfair.
68. One might say that self-selection is feasible if ordinary people would not be interested
in engaging in the prohibited behavior. But if the only people who want to perform the acts
are those who seek the exemption, granting them an exemption will produce the same
practical effect as not having a regulation; thus, the state can decide between exceptionless
regulation and no regulation. This is the situation with a possible ban on sucking the blood
of circumcised babies. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
69. See GREENAWALT, supranote 66, at 51.
70. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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actually form and articulate their preferences in response to the
boundaries of an exemption. v
For all these reasons, governments cannot grant exemptions to all
those whose strength of preference exceeds a certain margin. The
grounds for an exemption must rest on something qualitatively
different from the typical reasons that would lead most people to
wish to perform acts forbidden by law. Two major candidates are
religion and nonreligious morality.
Before I proceed, I want to narrow the relevant category of
nonreligious morality somewhat. People base their moral judgments
on a variety of sources, and these judgments may be powerful or
weak. Suppose Ben is a utilitarian who works as a nurse. He has a
sense that the practical operation of the system for jury participation is highly inefficient and he also thinks that nurses play a social
role that is so valuable that he should be excused from jury duty.
But he has no intrinsic objection to being on a jury, and he thinks
it would be much better to serve than to go to jail for any period of
time. One might say Ben perceives moral reasons not to serve, even
that he has a moral objection to serving, but he is not the sort of
person who should be getting an exemption. Any system of conscription would be hard to maintain if everyone like him were exempted.
Something stronger is needed. A person should be exempted only if
he has an objection in conscience or is a conscientious objector to
doing what is required of most people. Now, the line between an
objection in conscience and other moral reasons not to comply is far
from simple, but when we say someone objects in conscience to
doing something, we assume that he thinks he should be willing to
undergo significant hardship rather than do that thing. (He may or
may not have the strength of character to undergo such hardship.)
71. I recently talked to a Lutheran who said he was still troubled by his successful claim
to be a conscientious objector. He initially put the point as if the issue was whether, as a
faithful Lutheran, he could be a pacifist. I pointed out that, as he well knew, the law did not
require membership in a pacifist denomination and that some Roman Catholics-not
members of a pacifist religion-were pacifists. I also pointed out that his claim was certainly
religious, and asked whether the crux of the problem did not come down to whether, in some
sense, he was really a selective objector rather than a pacifist. He said the answer was "yes,"
although there was no doubt that at the time he applied, he did believe himself to be a general
objector. The matter that troubled him was not whether he had lied, but whether he was a
victim of some subtle self-deception.
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In what follows, I assume that the relevant nonreligious moral
claims to be exempted should amount to an objection in conscience.
This conclusion leads naturally to two questions. First, is there a
separate category of nonreligious claims of conscience or are all
claims of conscience rendered religious because of their strength
or their centrality in an individual's life? Two Supreme Court cases
interpreting the Selective Service Act move toward treating all
claims of conscientious opposition as religious," but I think clarity
of understanding is better served if we grant that extremely
powerful moral claims that bear no connection to religious beliefs or
organizations, as these are ordinarily understood, are not religious.
Our second question is more difficult. Should religious claims for
exemptions be limited to objections in conscience? The short answer
is no. Religious groups and individuals may have strong reasons to
preserve various religious practices that do not amount to claims of
conscience. Perhaps an inmate should be allowed to wear a cross
around his neck even though applying a general prohibition against
such items of dress to him would not violate his conscience. This
short answer does not resolve a more refined inquiry. If we grant
that when religious claims for exemption that do not involve moral
reasons at all (except in the sense that adherents claim that denying
the exemptions would be unjust) need not amount to objections in
conscience, what of claims that are distinctly moral, such as not
participating in military service? Should these religious claims
have to amount to objections in conscience? This possible approach
has considerable appeal and not least because it might lead to
equality of treatment of religious and nonreligious moral conviction.
However, I am hesitant to embrace it as an exceptionless principle,
in part because the line between moral and nonmoral reasons to act
can be so elusive.
How should religious claims for exemptions be regarded in
relation to nonreligious claims of conscience? Many of the most
powerful reasons people have not to adhere to general regulations
concern their religion. For most religious people in the United
States, religious responsibilities involve a sense of duty to a
72. See especially the plurality opinion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-44
(1970). The predecessor case giving a very broad meaning to the statutory requirement of
"belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" was United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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transcendent power, but even for those who do not believe in God,
or gods, religion can be a powerful source of identification and
community. 7 It would definitely not make sense to exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors and fail to exempt religious conscientious objectors; such a comparative hostility to religious grounds
would be unjustified.
Harder questions are posed by the possibility of restricting an
exemption to religious persons, to members of religious groups, or
to members of named religious groups. Analysis is simplest if we
take these possibilities in reverse order.
A fundamental principle of liberal democracy, though one not
observed to its fullest extent in countries with established churches,
is that the government should not favor one religious group over
others.7 4 An exemption limited to members of named religions
begins with an initial strike against it. If two religious groups are
relevantly similar, they should be treated similarly.
The best that can be said for an exemption restricted to a named
group is that no other group may be relevantly similar. Part of the
rationale for excusing the Amish from paying Social Security taxes
is that members of that community will not receive Social Security
from the government, and that because the Amish have a long
historical continuity and relatively few members leave the community,7 5 the government is assured that not many elderly former
Amish will need government assistance. If no other group quite
meets these requisites, why not cast an exemption in terms of the
Amish? The problem is that over time some other group might
qualify. Were legislatures constantly attentive to such developments, one might say, "Let them include another group when, and
if, it comes along." But legislators are not attentive in this way, and
success in legislation often depends on political pressure. A statute
limited by name to the Amish invites future unfairness. A legisla-

73. JOHN WILSON, RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE EFFECTIVE PRESENCE 189-90

(1978) (discussing the relationship between religion and community).
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES

AND POLICIES § 12.2.2 (2d ed. 2002).
75. BARRY, supra note 23, at 191-92, 242 (asserting that twenty percent leave before
baptism, and that a powerful reason for the elderly not to leave is that they have no external
means of support).
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ture should adopt a general formula that fits the Amish and could
include other groups in the future.76
Is it all right to name the Amish at all? I think the answer here
is "yes," though the point is debatable. If the legislature knows it
wants to exempt the Amish, it may say so. The risk is that over
time, the Amish may lose some of the characteristics that warrant
an exemption. Further, one may worry that naming constitutes a
subtle endorsement. However, when the group named is a small
minority obviously not being endorsed as the "true faith," the
convenience of naming an obvious beneficiary should outweigh the
concerns about future inappropriate application and implicit
approval.7 7
Turning to the question of whether group membership should
ever be a requirement of exemption, we can distinguish between
exemptions that are intrinsically for groups, or require group
participation, and those that are intrinsically for individuals. An
exemption from a requirement that applies to organizations
obviously would cover organizations; for example, religious organizations may discriminate on grounds of religion in their employment
decisions. Other exemptions presuppose group concerns and
activities. Thus, the government might decide to allow indigenous
groups to kill a limited number of a protected species of whale.78 The
general prohibition on killing whales would apply to individuals (as
well as companies); the exemption would turn on the need of some
identifiable group.
Other exemptions could, in principle, go to individuals whose
claims need not attach to membership in groups. Two examples are
exemptions from military service and exemptions from bans on the
use of peyote. Here, much depends on the nature of an exemption,
how it is administered, and the possibility of fraud. Conscientious
objection to military service is an individual matter, and an
administrative screening process allows scrutiny of sincerity.
76. Finding a general formula may prove somewhat difficult, especially if individual
legislators disagree over just why the Amish deserve an exemption.
77. Nevertheless, the position that legislation should operate only by general formulas,
even when the obvious aim is to reach a particular group, is a reasonable alternative.
78. See Sarah Kershaw, In Petition to Government, Tribe Hopes for Return to Whaling
Past, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A16 (describing the Makah tribe's attempt to legally
revive its tradition of whale hunting).
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Especially given the fact that those committing outright fraud can
easily join a pacifist religious group and feign pacifist beliefs, it does
not make sense to require group membership. However, an individualized privilege to use peyote or marijuana as a personal act of
worship, applied after the fact, opens up the law to extreme
administrative difficulties and abuse. If an exemption is to be given,
requiring that use be within a group setting (and possibly requiring
that the user be a member of the group) makes sense.
Our most serious question about categorization is whether nonreligious conscientious beliefs and deep-seated practices should
be treated as favorably as religious ones? The answer could be
"always," "sometimes," or "never.""9
We can reject the "never" answer straightaway. In some circumstances, nonreligious conscientious claims will seem about as
pressing as religious ones and roughly as easy to administer. That
is the case in respect to conscientious objection. An administrative
structure that determines whether claimants are honest can assess
the convictions of nonreligious pacifists about as well as those of
religious ones. °
The hard issue is whether, if exemptions are to be given to people
with religiously grounded moral reasons, they always, or only
sometimes, should extend to conscientious nonreligious claimants.
My answer is "sometimes," because for some exemptions religion
may be special.
One might offer prudential, historical or cultural, and principled
grounds for treating religion as special. By prudential grounds, I
refer to convenience in categorization and administration.8 ' Even
though a perfect categorization, perfectly applied, might not draw
the line at religion, religious claimants could overlap nearly
79. One might think that in some situations, a choice either way would be reasonable. One
might believe even that the choice comes down to a close prudential judgment that precludes
saying either decision is right or wrong. I mean here not only that making the assessment is
extremely difficult, but that even someone with full information and having done the
assessment of values would not use the terminology of right and wrong.
80. No doubt, a member of a pacifist church needs to explain less about his own point of
view, but some religious claimants will not belong to pacifist churches. Further, one who sets
out to commit systematic fraud will not find it very difficult to feign whatever religious beliefs,
if any, are required to join a pacifist church. I add the "if any" because my impression is that
many Quaker congregations are extremely inclusive in terms of belief.
81. See supratext accompanying note 77.
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completely with those who should be exempted, and sorting out the
merits of nonreligious claimants might be very difficult. Under these
conditions, a law justifiably would limit an exemption to religious
claimants. An exemption of the Amish, and other similar religious
groups, from requirements of schooling beyond a particular age,
provides an illustration. We can imagine a stable nonreligious
community whose members feel as strongly as the Amish that
schooling beyond the eighth grade is destructive of values they hold
dear and jeopardizes the fundamental welfare of the children
exposed to further school, and we can further imagine that few
children leave this community upon becoming adults. But, after a
careful look at historical sources, suppose we fail to discover any
such community that has ever existed. Given the evanescence of
virtually all nonreligious voluntary communal experiments within
the United States and the countries of Western Europe, which
history also reveals, we further conclude that the emergence of such
a community is extremely unlikely. Under these circumstances, a
legislative choice to limit an exemption to religious groups would
make prudential sense.
By a historical or cultural justification, I mean that, within a
particular society, religion is considered special.8 2 Such a view might
actually be embodied in a constitution. Thus, it may plausibly be
claimed that the religion clauses of our federal Constitution
instantiate the view that religion is special. An argument that the
special place of religion is enshrined by history or accepted in
modern society need not rest on a principled defense of the special
place of religion; it is enough for political leaders, and judges, to
implement the fundamental cultural values-at least it is enough
if giving religion that place is not positively unjust.8 3
Can one offer a principled defense for treating religion as special,
a defense that does not rely only on history, existing culture, or
prudence, and that could counter arguments that affording a
82. This conclusion might, or might not, lead to a judgment that it is always
constitutionally permissible to limit an exemption to religious claimants.
83. If the special place of religion is not solidly entrenched in constitutional law, the
argument that it justifies limiting exemptions to religious practices is open to the
counterargument that societies have long accepted all sorts of unjust inequalities, that
legislators should counter these, and that, if no principled distinction favors religion, a
legislature's granting exemptions only for religious beliefs and practices is unjust.

2007]

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS

1631

religion a special place is unjust? Here we may begin with defenses
that rely on the truth, or possible truth, of religious premises.
Defending a special place for religion is easiest if one relies directly
on religious premises, such as the premises commonly held in the
United States that religion concerns the relation of human beings
to a transcendent God and that this relation supersedes in importance all human relations, including one's responsibility to comply
with law.
This defense of distinguishing religious claims for exemption
from nonreligious ones faces three difficulties. First, a reasonable
representative government is not likely to adopt measures that
legislators believe require citizens to violate actual obligations to
God. So, the more precise justification for an exemption must be
that the government, insofar as is feasible, should not require
people to violate what they perceive as their obligations to God. To
this extent, at least, the exemption will go to people who are seen by
most members of a society as having a mistaken sense of their
obligations to God.'
Second, this particular justification seems not to cover people
who have a radically mistaken view about religion. What about
religious people who worship ancestors, or thousands of divinities,
or do not believe in any god? Why should they get an exemption? 5
Third, it is highly doubtful in a liberal democracy, especially one
with a rule against an establishment of religion, that the government should legislate on the basis of what is a "correct" theological
view. 6

84. I can imagine at least one qualification. People might believe that various individuals
have special vocations and that some of these vocations would preclude actions in which
others engage. Thus, it might be thought that monks have a religious obligation not to serve
on juries, although such service is fine for lay persons.
85. Perhaps "religion" is the best way to categorize, and these people will benefit
indirectly from a justification based on sound religious views, but that justification does not
directly apply to them.
86. Instead of supposing that a religious view based on a transcendental God is true, the
government might instead assume that such a view may be true, and act accordingly. Michael
McConnell writes of a political theory that includes the possibility of a transcendent God.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15. A government
would sensibly rely on such a theory only if it thought the probability of truth to be high
(something very close to adopting it as a "correct" view) or if it deferred to the sentiments of
most, or many citizens (the theory to follow).
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A more modest approach is to say that within the individual
lives of many citizens, religion has a special place. Many people
perceive their religion as involving relations with a transcendent
God. Whether they are wise or foolish, the government should not
demand that they do what they believe God forbids them from
doing, or does not want them to do. This justification does not
depend on a claim about the actual existence of God and about God's
nature and will. This justification does not itself pick up religious
claims that do not posit any such obligations, but one might
conclude that religion is the reasonable or required criterion of
classification and that a high percentage of religious claims (in our
culture) will concern perceived transcendent obligations. For
officials, this version of the "in principle" argument is preferable to
one that depends on the claimed truth of any religious view, but
many citizens attracted to the stronger assertion will reasonably
accept exemptions on that ground.
A rather different basis for distinguishing most religious claims
from most nonreligious claims of conscience is that the former
derive from regimes of social regulation that are separate from the
state's legal norms.8 7 There may be value in letting such systems
flourish, not supplanting them at every turn with the state's rules.'
With respect to the question whether any particular proposed
exemption should be limited to religious claimants, officials should
consider "in principle," historical and cultural, and prudential
arguments. Sometimes, these will justify limiting the category of
claims to religious ones.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OR LEGISLATIVE CHOICE
In regard to whether exemption issues should be viewed as
matters of constitutional right or left to legislative choice, one
cannot prescribe in general for all liberal democracies.8 9 Some
87. See Waldron, supra note 12, at 16-18, 23-24. However, one could be a religious
conscientious objector after developing individual convictions about war without being a
member of any group with a norm against military service.
88. See id. at 17-18 (citing Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983)).
89. We shall look at those questions, insofar as possible, without a general predisposition
for or against judicial resolution of problems as matters of constitutional law. A person who
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assign greater responsibilities to the courts than do others, and
the textual meaning and underlying understanding of specific
constitutional provisions count. For various challenges to classifications, it could make a controlling difference whether a constitutional text protects a right to conscience or a right to the exercise of
religion, or both, and whether it forbids an establishment of religion.
I assume in most of what follows that, as in the United States, the
Constitution guarantees the free exercise of religion, but not
freedom of conscience, and that it forbids an establishment of
religion.9 ° Readers should be aware that many constitutions and
international documents have no guarantee against established
religion, and that some protect freedom of conscience, understood
more broadly than religious conscience. 9'
Unconstitutionality in the United States is most apparent when
a classification favors some religions over others. A rule against
establishment bars favoring particular religions, and a principle of
free exercise implies, at least in a regime with no establishment,
that peoples of different faiths will have equal rights of religious
exercise.9 2 If some religions cannot be favored over others, an
exemption given to members of one religion must be given to
members of another similarly situated religion.93 Suppose two
different religions require use of wine in family religious ceremonies; were a state that prohibits the drinking of alcoholic beverages
to make an exception for family devotional use in one of the two
religions, but not the other, its classification would be unconstitubelieves that judicial review is unhealthy, that virtually all political issues should be decided
by bodies that are politically responsible, will oppose judicial review if it is proposed and will
wish to limit its scope if it is already entrenched.
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. See, e.g., TORKiYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [Constitution] art. 24 (Turk.)
(guaranteeing everyone "freedom of conscience).
92. There is an argument that in the United States the original religion clauses
contemplated that Christian religions could be favored over non-Christian religions, but
virtually no one has defended this position for modern constitutional law, and I shall not
pause to address it. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99-100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
93. The sentence in the text equivocates about what constitutes being similarly situated.
If members of each group have the same interest in an exemption, clearly one group cannot
be favored because officials want to advance it or regard its theological position as more
sound. If the government is to distinguish among religions, it must have neutral, secular
reasons for doing so.
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tional (unless the state could present a powerful nonreligious reason
why the exemption should go to members of one religion and not the
other).9 4 This, indeed, is what the Supreme Court held regarding a
benefit of tax reporting that it assumed a state legislature designed
to reach some religious groups and not others.9" Any exemption
formulated in terms of named religions risks such a finding of
unconstitutional classification, because a court may find some other
religion to be similarly situated.9 6
The reality that an exemption will benefit members of some
religions more than members of others does not itself create a
constitutional problem-a higher percentage of Quakers than
Presbyterians happen to be pacifists-but ordinarily a legislature
should not be allowed to make membership in a particular kind of
religion a condition of receiving an exemption. Such a strategy
-for example, exempting only pacifists who belong to pacifist
religions-might be defended on grounds of administrative convenience, but, in general, courts should regard it as unconstitutional
94. The issue of favoritism will look different in a country that has an established religion
or a constitution that fails to guarantee nonestablishment. If a country has a traditional
established church, with the government contributing to the salaries of clergy and to the
upkeep of buildings of the established church, a constitutional right of free exercise would not
assure equality in religious exercise, since members of the established church enjoy
advantages that others do not. An exemption that went only to members of the established
church or its members might be viewed as an aspect of the permitted establishment.
By a somewhat paradoxical logic, an exemption given to all but members of the established
church might also be all right. Here, the reasoning would be that members of the established
church have various political and financial advantages; a government might be able to offset
these by extending exemptions to others. If an exemption aided members of some
nonestablished religions but not the members of others, the argument would be stronger that
a principle of equal free exercise was violated, but the government could argue that the
existence of a religious establishment sets the understanding of free exercise as not involving
an equality principle. We need not pursue how these various arguments would play out if the
country has some kind of multiple establishment (in which some religions receive benefits
others do not) or is allowed constitutionally to create an established religion although it does
not then have one.
1
95. Lar-son v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). As Michael McConnell has written, "[t]he
test seems to be that accommodations need not be equal if there are 'neutral, secular reasons,'
not based on religious favoritism, for distinguishing among religious beliefs." Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 685, 708 (1992) (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 458 (1971)).
In many contexts the government would need more than some such reason and would have
to satisfy the compelling interest test that applies to suspect classifications.
96. Upon such a finding a court may hold the existing exemption invalid, extend it to
similarly situated groups, or give the legislature a limited time in which to resolve that issue.
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when the exemption concerns individual activity. Among other
reasons, the law should not encourage people who seek the exemption to join one religious group rather than another. When the
exemption involves participation in worship services, or otherwise
directly concerns the practice of a collectivity, an exemption may
turn on the nature of the group in which one participates.
The distinction between religious and nonreligious claimants is
most troubling. The hard question is whether an exemption cast in
terms of religion needs to be extended to all individuals whose
sentiment about engaging in the prohibited act is otherwise
similar to that of the religious claimant. Nonreligious conscientious
opposition to participating in war is a striking example.9 7
I have suggested that in some instances, it makes sense, on
principled, historical or cultural, and prudential grounds, to limit an
exemption to religious claims. Although one can reasonably argue
that a principle of nonestablishment or a more general principle
of equality always prevents the government from distinguishing
religious from comparable nonreligious claims,9 8 I think this
approach is too formalistic and demanding for situations in which
a parallel nonreligious claimant is highly unlikely to arise.
This leaves the central question whether the government should
be able to exempt a religious person, but not a nonreligious one,
when a belief (such as pacificism) or action has roughly the same
significance for them? There is a constitutional argument flowing
from the Free Exercise Clause that the government may always
make that choice: the Constitution permits free exercise accommodations, even when it does not demand them; thus, a legislature
may choose to accommodate religious exercise without accommodating similar nonreligious beliefs or practices.99
A technical legal argument to the contrary may be mounted on
the basis of Employment Division v. Smith, which held, with limited
qualifications, that the Free Exercise Clause guarantees no right to
97. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
98. In its strongest variety, the argument asserts that the government must classify
exemptions in a more general way, even if it expects the only persons who will qualify will be
religious.
99. This argument is not implausible, and three Justices accepted it in Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 371-74 (1970) (White, J., Burger, C.J., & Stewart, J., dissenting).
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exemptions.'0 0 On that understanding, perhaps one should not think
of religious exemptions created by legislatures as somehow extending a principle already built into the Free Exercise Clause itself.
Scholars, like myself, who continue to be dismayed by Employment
Division v. Smith will not find it a comforting premise from which
to reason about limits on legislative power; but even if one accepts
the principle of Smith, one may also believe that the Free Exercise
Clause signals something special about religion, including the
appropriateness of exemptions directed to religion.' 01 It is not
obvious that either the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause bars such exemptions, but they may bar some motivations for exemptions.
A broader argument against religion-only exemptions acknowledges that the Constitution and other legal materials are inconclusive, but relies on modern constitutional premises that when people
are otherwise similarly situated, people with certain kinds of
beliefs should not be favored over people with other kinds. On this
view, the combined effect of the Free Speech, Establishment, Free
Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses bars a preference limited
to religious grounds, unless the government has a reason for the
limitation that goes beyond preferring religion. This broader
argument can fit with a recognition that the Free Exercise Clause
does require some exemptions. In these circumstances, that clause
directly protects religious claimants; people with nonreligious but
otherwise similar convictions may be swept into the ring of protection by the force of other constitutional clauses.
According to my understanding, courts should recognize a principle of prima facie equality between religious and nonreligious
beliefs and activities, such that the government cannot treat
religious activities more favorably than otherwise similar nonreligious ones, unless it has some substantial reason to do so other than
a theological premise or popular opinion that religious beliefs and
actions are more deserving than nonreligious views. The issue
whether a legislature can treat similar religious and nonreligious
100. 494 U.S. 872, 878-83 (1990).
101. Someone who thinks Smith is fundamentally correct about the limits of judicial
competence may believe that legislatures have a constitutional obligation to create some
exemptions that is not judicially enforceable.
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beliefs and activities differently is a significant one for courts to
resolve. They should leave a degree of discretion to legislatures, but
sometimes declare that the exclusion of similarly situated nonreligious people is a constitutional violation.
The central question that remains for us is whether any exemptions from valid laws are constitutionally required and should be
enforced by courts in the face of legislative inaction. 1 2 Let us
assume that the constitutional language and history are indecisive,
as they are in the United States. Here we have the fundamental
issue the Court addressed in Employment Division v. Smith, when
it switched from a judicial test that allowed significant interferences
with the exercise of religion only if they were supported by compelling state interests to a rule that a religious challenge (unsupported
by any other constitutional right) could never succeed against a
valid law of general application.I°3 Thus, given a law against the use
of peyote, members of the Native American Church had no right to
use peyote in their worship services, although that use was the very
center of their worship, the church's most basic activity. According
to the Court's principle, it was irrelevant whether the state had any
need to extend its law to worship services and whether use in
worship was supremely important. The reaction of many, including
myself, was that this result was a travesty of free exercise protection, but perhaps that judgment was hasty.
The Court's approach might be defended on pragmatic or
principled grounds. By pragmatic grounds here, I refer mainly to the
functioning of courts. Perhaps judges are ill-equipped to decide
when exemptions should be given. A constitutional decision in favor
102. In describing a law as valid, I am assuming that the law is not, despite its general
wording, actually aimed against a particular religion and does not in its purpose discriminate
among religions. Rather, the complaint against the law's enforcement is that it effectively
infringes on an important religious belief or practice, in the manner that a general law about
humane slaughtering would infringe Jewish beliefs and practices concerning kosher
slaughter. See supratext accompanying notes 25-27.
I leave aside here whether a law that may not be intended to discriminate and does not
actually classify in terms of particular religions can nonetheless be regarded as discriminating
between religions if the grounds of classification turn out clearly to include some religions and
exclude others-a possible understanding of the issue in Larson v. Valente. See supra notes
95-96 and accompanying text.
103. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. A similar question arises if, during the period of
constitutional design, the framers might or might not provide for constitutionally mandated
exemptions.
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of an exemption requires an assessment of sincerity, some measure
of how much a belief or practice matters to an individual or religion,
and some assessment of whether the government's interests will
be unduly sacrificed by granting the exemption. These are not
inquiries, the argument goes, that courts should be making; they
are especially troublesome because courts should not enter the
thicket of making judgments about religion. An alternative constitutional course of courts sustaining virtually all religious claims is
even less palatable. Thus, courts should not be in this business at
all, and free exercise rights should not include rights to exemptions.
That, indeed, is the gist of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Smith. 0 4
Insofar as the critique of judicial assessment of claims for free
exercise exemptions is sound, it also reaches any broad legislative
authorizations to courts to "balance" such claims against competing
government interests, and shows that statutes like the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act °5 are unwise, if not unconstitutional, in
the burdens they impose on courts. °6
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan has challenged general protection of
religious exercise in a recent book strikingly titled The Impossibility
of Religious Freedom.'°7 Sullivan recounts a Florida dispute involving families who had installed upright monuments to commemorate loved ones in the City of Boca Raton, which had restricted that
part of its cemetery to flat memorials. 8 The case involved the
interpretation and application of the Florida Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.0 9
104. Id. at 887-90. If this pragmatic approach provided the main support for the rule of
Smith, one might believe that the legislature enforcing free exercise rights in good faith must,
or should, provide exemptions, but that courts cannot correct any failures on the part of
legislatures. This understanding would have powerful implications for how legislators should
regard their constitutional responsibilities.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
106. The critique does not condemn specific legislative exemptions that courts can enforce
without making difficult judgments on their own.
107. WINNIFRED FALLERS SuLvAN, THEIMPOSSIBILITYOFREUGIOUS FREEDOM 1-3 (2005).
108. Id. at 15-18.
109. Id. at 22-23. Two of the complexities of the case were that the rules clearly barred
upright monuments and that cemetery employees had told people they could be installed. See
id. at 17, 20. As long as other cemeteries were available, it is hard to see how religious
exercise could be substantially burdened for someone who, knowing the rules, chose to use an
area limited to flat monuments. A reliance argument would not seem dependent on a religious
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Sullivan rightly points out how hard it is to interpret the Act's
requirement that a person's religious exercise be substantially
burdened, when people advance religious reasons that connect to
their respective faiths but do not involve standard requirements
of the faith."' Most of the reasons individual plaintiffs gave for
choosing particular memorials fit into this category."' Sullivan
rightly criticizes the trial judge's conclusion, subsequently embraced
by the state supreme court, that a substantial burden on religious
exercise necessarily involves a prohibition or requirement of a
person's religion." 2 Considering both the statutory language and the
U.S. Supreme Court's approach to religious claims, the interpretation of the courts in the case is both too institutional-not adequately focused on an individual's beliefs and practices-and too
demanding---excluding choices that someone thinks are supported
by her religion but not required.
But Sullivan's main point is that the whole enterprise of discerning a substantial burden is too difficult. Early on, she writes that
"[florsaking religious freedom as a legally enforced right might
enable greater equality among persons and greater clarity and selfdetermination for religious individuals and communities.""' 3 And
the last sentence of her text suggests that a right to religious
freedom "may not be best realized through laws guaranteeing
religious freedom but by laws guaranteeing equality."" 4 Greater
clarity yes, but also better realization of religious freedom? It is
hard to see how in the very case she discusses religious freedom
would benefit. If someone just preferred an upright monument in an
area limited to flat monuments, she would be out of luck. Perhaps
Sullivan would favor specific exemptions given to people on grounds
of morality or conscience. This, in fact, is the general approach of
the vast majority of laws that allow medical personnel to refuse to
engage in certain medical procedures,"' and I believe it is often the
claim.
110. Id. at 107-08.
111. See id. at 35-53 (detailing the plaintiffs' reasonings and explanations).
112. See id. at 97-99.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id. at 159.
115. See Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures:Does Religion
Make a Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 820-21, 823-24.
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best approach. 116 In respect to upright markers, distinguishing
nonreligious claims of conscience from choices based on "mere"
sentiment or aesthetic judgment would be very hard. So, as far as
grave markers are concerned, the option of equality almost certainly
entails in practice that religious claims will end up being grouped
with all other sorts of preferences and will inevitably yield to
regulation.
Concerns about judicial competence undoubtedly have some force,
but Justice Scalia's approach in Smith allows the effective destruction of a religion on a slight state interest in general regulation." 7
That hardly seems a robust protection of the free exercise of
religion. Granting that work needs to be done to develop the best
formula for constitutional review of neutral laws that impinge on
religion, the Smith alternative of no review whatsoever emasculates
free exercise. Difficulties in standards of judicial review, hardly
unique to free exercise, are preferable to sacrificing a fundamental
constitutional guarantee.
What can we say about the principle of free exercise? Does it
reasonably include only a right against discrimination? Without
trying to answer this question for every political society, we shall
assume a modern liberal democracy with citizens of diverse religious
views and many small religious groups, with idiosyncratic practices,
who are not well represented in the legislative process. This
certainly describes the United States, and with increased immigration to other Western democracies, it also describes those liberal
democracies.
Early in this Essay, we saw that exemptions are sometimes
required by justice." 8 That does not itself show that exemptions
should be matters for the judiciary, but when we add that a crucial
aspect of constitutional rights should be the protection of minorities
against disregard in the legislative process, the argument for
judicial assessment builds. Of course, minorities cannot be protected
in every respect-far from it-but religious practice is of great
importance, and has long been regarded as a fundamental right.
116. One might argue that the Free Exercise Clause itself somehow requires exemptions
for conscience, religious or not, but Sullivan makes no such claim.
117. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
118. See supra Part I.
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And religion has been a fertile source of unjust discrimination.
Among minority beliefs and practices that should be protected,
religion has a powerful claim.
One reason for constitutional exemptions is to prevent outright
intentional discrimination, achieved by apparently neutral legislation, that courts are not in a position to identify. In this respect, the
direct right to exemption is an indirect means to avert purposeful
discrimination. But legislative neglect, which comes in the form
of attentive indifference or ignorant disregard, is of much broader
concern. Legislators may be aware that their general law will
probably have detrimental, even devastating, effects on some
religious practices or beliefs; but because those religions seem alien,
strange, and indefensible, the legislators do not regard these effects
as anything to worry about. This self-conscious attitude about
effects approaches intentional discrimination, but does not quite
move over the line according to some understandings of discrimination." 9 When an adversely affected minority religion is so far off the
"radar screen" that legislators do not consider it at all when they
adopt a general rule, we can talk of ignorant disregard.
Both these problems are well-addressed by courts considering
claims as ones of constitutional right. Indeed, Eisgruber and Sager
build a complete theory of constitutional exemptions on the basis of
protection against discrimination broadly conceived.' 2 ° According
to their approach, courts considering claims for constitutional
exemptions should pose counterfactual questions about how
legislators would have treated similar religious interests had they
been part of mainstream religions.' One need not accept either
their rejection of all "privilege" arguments for exemptions, or their
precise recommendations about judicial approaches, to see that
protecting against unfair indifference and neglect is a strong reason
for constitutional exemptions.
Ira Lupu has urged that judicial exemptions are constitutionally
preferable to legislative ones.'22 He is concerned partly that
119. In standard criminal law terminology, one might speak about recklessness regarding
these harmful effects.
120. See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 15.
121. Id. at 1289.
122. See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
743, 780 (1992).
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legislators will undervalue minority religions and be insufficiently
respectful of establishment limits.1 23 Whether one accepts or rejects
his recommendation that legislative exemptions be considered
unconstitutional, he provides strong reasons for welcoming some
judicial exemptions.
If we conclude that courts should enforce some constitutional
exemptions for religious claims, it does not follow that nonreligious
conscientious claims must suffer by comparison. That religious
claimants must be treated better than most people who are subject
to a restrictive law does not entail that they may be treated better
than others whose nonreligious objections to a law resemble their
own.
In summary, it is troublesome for courts to decide that some
citizens will be relieved from obligations imposed generally, and it
is troublesome for courts to make the necessary assessments about
religious needs and state interests; but the Smith alternative
involves such a blatant inattention to the fundamental political
rights of citizens that it should be abandoned. If this analysis is
correct, it leaves open the question of just how courts should
exercise their protection of free exercise rights and, particularly,
just how much latitude they should leave for reasonable legislative
judgments. But a constitutional rule that permits the prohibition of
practices deemed fundamental by religious individuals and groups
on the slenderest of public needs is intolerable. The combination
of positions that I defend is that free exercise demands certain
exemptions but that nonestablishment, equal protection, and free
speech sometimes require extension to similarly situated nonreligious claimants.

123. See id. at 776-79.

